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Abstract—Recommender systems rely on large datasets of
historical data and entail serious privacy risks. A server offering
Recommendation as a Service to a client might leak more infor-
mation than necessary regarding its recommendation model and
dataset. At the same time, the disclosure of the client’s preferences
to the server is also a matter of concern. Devising privacy-
preserving protocols using general cryptographic primitives (e.g.,
secure multi-party computation or homomorphic encryption),
is a typical approach to overcome privacy concerns, but in
conjunction with state-of-the-art recommender systems often
yields far-from-practical solutions.
In this paper, we tackle this problem from the direction
of constructing crypto-friendly machine learning algorithms. In
particular, we propose CryptoRec, a secure framework for Rec-
ommendation as a Service, which encompasses a homomorphic
encryption friendly recommender system. This recommendation
model possesses two interesting properties: (1) It models user-
item interactions in an item-only latent feature space in which
personalized user representations are automatically captured by
aggregating pre-learned item features. This means that a server
with a pre-trained model can provide recommendations for a
client whose data is not in its training set. Nevertheless, re-
training the model with the client’s data still improves accuracy.
(2) It only uses addition and multiplication operations, making
the model straightforwardly compatible with homomorphic en-
cryption schemes.
We demonstrate the efficiency and accuracy of CryptoRec
on three real-world datasets. CryptoRec allows a server with
thousands of items to privately answer a prediction query within
a few seconds on a single PC, while its prediction accuracy
is still competitive with state-of-the-art recommender systems
computing over clear data.
Index Terms—Recommendation as a Service, Homomorphic
Encryption, Privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
Recommender system is one of the most frequently used
machine learning applications, which is closely linked to our
daily lives. For example, users can always receive personalized
item recommendations (e.g., products, videos, etc.) when
visiting websites like Amazon and Youtube. This is because
their recommender systems are estimating user preferences by
analyzing massive historical data, such as browsing records
and locations. On one hand, a user can efficiently get preferred
products from a vast number of items due to the recommender
system; on the other hand, the user data is exposed to the
service provider and can be abused [1], [2]. As such, it results
in immediate privacy risks to the user. In this paper, we study
how to obtain efficient and accurate recommendation services
while preserving data privacy. As an illustrative example,
consider the following scenario:
A user (client) with some private data (e.g., ratings) would
like to buy a recommendation service to efficiently figure
out the most favorable products from a large number of
potential candidates. A service provider (e.g., Amazon) has
already collected a large database of ratings given by its users
on sold items and wishes to monetize its data by selling
Recommendation as a Service (RaaS). Different from existing
recommender systems, in our scenario the client is unwilling
to expose her data to the service provider due to the worries
of privacy leakage. At the same time, commercial concerns or
requirements may prevent the service provider from releasing
its trained recommendation model to the public. In addition,
releasing a trained model may also bring privacy risks to the
users in the service provider’s database.
We can formalize the above scenario as a secure two-party
computation (2PC) protocol. We first describe the Recommen-
dation as a Service (RaaS) as a 2PC protocol, where on one
side we have the Server (service provider) with its training
data and on the other side the Client with her input. When
the protocol terminates, the Client learns a prediction for her
input. For obvious reasons, the protocol is only as useful to
the Client as the accuracy of the predictions. Then we define
the security of the 2PC protocol from two aspects: (1) the
Client should only learn the predictions (including what can
be inferred from the predictions); (2) the Server should not
learn anything about the Client’s input. General cryptographic
primitives such as secure multi-party computation (SMC) and
homomorphic encryption (HE) are immediate candidates to
overcome these security concerns.
State-of-the-art recommender systems often rely on non-
linear operations, or require training the recommendation
model with the Client’s data [3]–[6]. Generic solutions usually
come at a prohibitive cost in terms of efficiency. While
improving cryptographic tools (e.g., HE or SMC) is one
typical way to achieve more efficient privacy-preserving so-
lutions, unfortunately, the improvement is usually far from
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satisfactory to make these solutions practical enough. Recently,
CryptoNets [7] and MiniONN [8] have been proposed for
privacy-preserving neural networks based Machine Learning
as a Service (MLaaS), the scenario of which is similar to ours.
The primary contribution of CryptoNets and MiniONN is how
to efficiently compute non-linear operations on encrypted data.
Instead of using state-of-the-art non-linear activation functions
such as ReLu (relu(x) = max(0, x)), CryptoNets proposed
using a square activation function (f(x) = x2) to avoid non-
linear operations, to facilitate evaluating neural networks on
encrypted data. This approach may result in a significant accu-
racy loss [8]. MiniONN introduced a multi-round interactive
protocol based on HE and garbled circuits [9], in which non-
linear operations were computed by interactions between the
Server and the Client. This method requires the two parties
to be online constantly, which may increase the difficulty of
using MLaaS.
Our contributions. We tackle this problem from the di-
rection of designing crypto-friendly machine learning algo-
rithms, so that we can achieve efficient solutions by directly
using existing cryptographic tools. In particular, we propose
CryptoRec, a new non-interactive secure 2PC protocol for
RaaS, the key technical innovation of which is an HE-
friendly recommender system. This recommendation model
possesses two important properties: (1) It uses only addition
and multiplication operations, so that it is straightforwardly
compatible with HE schemes. With this property, CryptoRec
is able to complete recommendation computations without
requiring the Server and the Client to be online continuously.
Simply put, the Client sends her encrypted rating vector to
the Server, then the Server computes recommendations with
the Client’s input and returns the results in an encrypted form.
In addition to this, there is no other interaction between the
two parties; (2) It can automatically extract personalized user
representations by aggregating pre-learned item features, that
we say the model has an item-only latent feature space. This
property allows the Server with a pre-trained model to provide
recommendation services without a tedious re-training process,
which significantly improves the efficiency performance. Note
that the Client’s data is not in the Server’s database which is
used for model training. In order to make the RaaS secure 2PC
protocol more complete, we also precisely define the security
notion of CryptoRec in this paper.
CryptoRec is able to produce recommendations in a direct
mode (using only a pre-trained model learned on the Server’s
database which does not contain the Client’s data) or in a re-
training mode (where the model is first re-trained with the
Client’s input before computing recommendations). The re-
training mode produces slightly more accurate predictions. In
the direct mode, we can instantiate our protocol with an addi-
tive HE scheme such as the very efficient Paillier cryptosys-
tem [10]. We test both modes of CrytoRec on MovieLens-1M
(ml1m) [11], Netflix (netlfix) [12] and Yahoo-R4 (yahoo) [13]
public datasets. Experiment results show that the direct mode
allows the Server with thousands of items to privately answer
a prediction query in a few seconds on a single PC. To re-train
the model with the Client’s input, we need a limited number
of homomorphic additive and multiplicative operations. There-
fore, we must rely on a Somewhat HE scheme (SWHE) [14].
Besides the advantage that our solution relies only on linear
operations and converges in a very few numbers of iterations,
the accuracy of the predictions produced by our model is
less than 2% away from those achieved by the most accurate
collaborative learning algorithms known to date (depending
on the datasets). In practice, the Client can choose either of
the two modes, according to her preference on the trade-off
between accuracy and efficiency.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce collaborative filtering and
homomorphic encryption. For simplicity, the adopted notation
and commonly used variables are summarized in Table I.
Scalars are denoted in lower-case characters, vectors are
denoted in lower-case bold characters, matrices are denoted
in Upper-case bold characters. We write a← b to denote the
algorithmic action of assigning the value of b to the variable
a, and x←$ X for the action of sampling a uniformly random
element x from set X .
n/m number of users / items
R ∈ Nn×m rating matrix
rui rating given by user u for item i
rˆui estimation of rui
ru ∈ N1×m rating vector of user u : {rui}mi=1
ri ∈ Nn×1 rating vector of item i : {rui}nu=1
r¯u/r¯i mean rating of user u / item i
φui φui = 1 if rui exists, otherwise φui = 0.
Θ general form of model parametersJxK encryption of xJxK {Jx1K, Jx2K, Jx3K, · · · }
pk/sk public key / secret key
⊕ addition between two ciphertexts
or a plaintext and a ciphertex
 multiplication between
a plaintext and a ciphertex
⊗ multiplication between two ciphertextsJxKJyK ∑iJxiK⊗ JyiK, homomorphic dot-product
x JyK {x Jy1K, x Jy2K, x Jy3K, · · · }
D0 s≈ D1 distributions are statistically indistinguishable
D0 c≈ D1 distributions are computationally indistinguishable
TABLE I: Variables and notations
A. Collaborative Filtering
Collaborative filtering (CF) algorithms are the current state-
of-the-art recommender systems in terms of accuracy [3],
[15]. Chronologically, the memory-based approach, such as
neighborhood-based methods (NBMs), is the first class of
prevalent recommendation algorithms. Not only this class
benefits from a good prediction accuracy, it also inherits rec-
ommendation explainability [16]; Later, model-based approach
algorithms, of which matrix factorization (MF) is a notable ex-
ample, became popular due to their exceptional accuracy [15].
Recently, with the rise of deep learning, neural network based
recommender systems are emerging, such as AutoRec [17],
leading the current prediction accuracy benchmarks [3].
1) Neighborhood-Based Method (NBM): The neighbor-
hood based method estimates a user’s rating on a targeted
item by taking the weighted average of a certain number of
ratings of the user or of the item. Formally, an item-based
NBM (I-NBM) is defined as
rˆui = r¯i +
∑
j∈Nu(i) sij(ruj − r¯j)∑
j∈Nu(i) |sij |
, (1)
where r¯i is the mean rating of item i, sij ∈ Sm×m represents
the similarity between item i and j, and Nu(i) denotes
a set of items rated by user u that are the most similar
to item i according to the similarity matrix S ∈ Rm×m.
Pearson correlation is one of the most widely used similarity
metrics [15]:
sij =
∑
u∈Uij (rui − r¯i)(ruj − r¯j)√∑
u∈Uij (rui − r¯i)2
√∑
u∈Uij (ruj − r¯j)2
, (2)
where Uij denotes the set of users that rated both items i and
j. The matrix of similarities S is the model parameters Θ of
NBM, Θ = {S}. User-based NBM (U-NBM) is the symmetric
counterpart of I-NBM. Normally, I-NBM is more accurate and
robust than U-NBM [15].
2) Matrix Factorization (MF): Let Rn×m be a sparse
rating matrix formed by n users and m items, in which
each user rated only a small number of the m items, and
the missing values are marked with zero. Matrix factorization
(MF) decomposes the rating matrix R into two low-rank and
dense feature matrices [4]:
R ≈ PQT , (3)
where P ∈ Rn×d is the user feature space, Q ∈ Rm×d is the
item feature space and d ∈ N+ is the dimension of user and
item features. To predict how user u would rate item i, we
compute rˆui = puqTi , where p1×du ⊂ P and q1×di ⊂ Q denote
the learned features vectors of user u and item i, respectively.
A standard way of optimizing P and Q is to minimize the
regularized squared error function
min
P,Q
∑
(u,i)∈R
(puq
T
i − rui)2 + λ(||pu||2 + ||qi||2), (4)
by using the stochastic gradient descent (SGD) optimization
method [4], but only based on observed ratings (rating matrix
R is sparse). The constant λ is a regularization factor. The
model parameters of MF are Θ = {P,Q}.
3) Neural Network Approach: In addition to the success
of neural networks in visual recognition and speech synthesis
tasks is widely diffused, many works also focus on construct-
ing neural recommender systems. (We refer to the reader to [3]
for an overview.) AutoRec [17] is a notable example, built on
top of Autoencoders [18]. Item-based AutoRec (I-AutoRec)
reconstructs the inputs ri by computing
rˆi = f(W · g(Vri + b(1)) + b(2)), (5)
where g(·) and f(·) are activation functions, e.g. the Sig-
moid function ( 11+e−x ) or ReLu function (max(0, x)). Non-
linear activation functions are crucial to the success of neural
networks. Model parameters are defined as follows: Θ =
{W,V,b(1),b(2)}, where W ∈ Rn×d and V ∈ Rd×n are for
‘transformations’, and b(1) ∈ Rd×1 and b(2) ∈ Rn×1 are for
“bias” terms. Θ is learned by using the SGD to minimize the
regularized square error function
min
W,V,b(1),b(2)
∑
i∈R
||rˆi − ri||2 + λ(||W||2 + ||V||2), (6)
where the gradient of each model parameter is computed by
only observed ratings [17]. Equation (6) defines I-AutoRec.
The user-based AutoRec (U-AutoRec) is defined symmetri-
cally in the obvious way. Experimental results show that I-
AutoRec outperforms U-AutoRec in terms of accruracy [17].
B. Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption (HE) is a form of encryption that
allows computations to be carried over ciphertexts. The result,
after decryption, is the same as if the operations had been per-
formed on the plaintexts [19]. As an illustrative example, con-
sider two plaintexts x1 and x2 and their corresponding cipher-
texts Jx1K ←$ HE.Enc(x1, pk) and Jx2K ←$ HE.Enc(x2, pk).
An encryption scheme is additively homomorphic if it satis-
fies x1 + x2 = HE.Dec(Jx1K ⊕ Jx2K, sk) or multiplicatively
homomorphic if we have x1×x2 = HE.Dec(Jx1K⊗ Jx2K, sk),
where ⊕ and ⊗ represent the homomorphic addition and
homomorphic multiplication operations, respectively.
Some HE schemes are only either additively homomor-
phic or multiplicatively homomorphic, such as [10]. The
schemes that fall into this category are know to be partially
homomorphic (PHE). Schemes that support both additions
and multiplications, but only a limited number of times,
are known as somewhat homomorphic (SWHE), as opposed
to those that allow an unbounded number of homomorphic
operations, which are called fully homomorphic encryption
(FHE) schemes [14], [19]. The efficiency of the schemes
in each class is usually related to the expressiveness of the
supported operations, meaning that PHE schemes are more
efficient than SWHE schemes, which in turn are more efficient
that FHE schemes.
In addition to the additively or multiplicatively homomor-
phic properties of ciphertexts, HE schemes also allow addi-
tions and multiplications between a ciphertext and a plaintext,
i.e. x1 + x2 = HE.Dec(Jx1K ⊕ x2, sk) and x1 × x2 =
HE.Dec(Jx1K x2, sk).
SYNTAX. A HE scheme is a tuple of four ppt algorithms
HE := (HE.Setup,HE.Enc,HE.Eval,HE.Dec) as follows:
• HE.Setup(1λ) is the setup algorithm. It takes as input the
security parameter λ and outputs a private/public key pair
(sk, pk). The public key pk includes a description of the
message space M.
• HE.Enc(m, pk) is the encryption algorithm, which takes
as input the public key pk and a message m ∈ M and
outputs a ciphertext c.
• HE.Eval(f, c1, ..., ct, pk) is the homomorphic evaluation
algorithm. It takes as input a public key pk, a circuit
f : Mt → M in a class F of supported circuits and t
ciphertexts c1, ..., ct, and returns a ciphertext c.
• HE.Dec(c, sk) is the decryption algorithm that on input a
secret key sk and a ciphertext c, it returns a message m
or a special failure symbol ⊥.
We now briefly describe correctness, IND-CPA security and
circuit privacy for a homomorphic encryption scheme HE.
CORRECTNESS. HE is correct if for all honestly generated
keys (pk, sk) ←$ HE.Setup(1λ), for all supported f ∈ F
and for all messages (m1, ...,mt) ∈ Mt, we have that if
ci ←$ HE.Enc(pk,mi), ∀i ∈ [t], then it holds with overwhelm-
ing probability over the random coins of all algorithms that
HE.Dec(HE.Eval(f, (c1, ..., ct), pk), sk) = f(m1, ...,mt).
IND-CPA SECURITY. This is the standard notion of security
for any homomorphic encryption scheme. It guarantees that
nothing can be learned from a ciphertext about the message it
encrypts (beyond, perhaps, its length).
Definition 1. We say that HE is IND-CPA secure if for
every legitimate ppt adversary A := (A0,A1) the following
definition of advantage is negligible in the security parameter:
Advind-cpaHE,A (λ) := 2 · Pr[IND-CPAAHE(1λ)]− 1 ,
where game IND-CPAAHE is described in Figure. 1 and a
legitimate adversary outputs in its first stage (i.e. algorithm
A0) two messages of equal bit length.
IND-CPAAHE(1
λ):
(sk, pk) ←$ HE.Setup(1λ)
(m0,m1, st) ←$ A0(1λ, pk)
b ←$ {0, 1}
c ←$ HE.Enc(pk,mb)
b′ ←$ A1(st, c)
return (b = b′)
Fig. 1: IND-CPA security game
CIRCUIT PRIVACY. An additional requirement of many HE
applications, including ours, is that the evaluated ciphertext
should also hide the function f , apart from what is inevitably
leaked through the outcome of the computation. This property
is known as the circuit privacy [20], [21].
Definition 2. A homomorphic encryption scheme HE is circuit
private if there exists a ppt simulator S such that for any
security parameter λ, any key pair (sk, pk)←$ HE.Setup(1λ),
any supported function f ∈ F and any tuple of messages
m1, ...,mt ∈Mt, it holds that
((sk, pk), (c1, ..., ct),HE.Eval(f, c1, ..., ct, pk))
s≈ ((sk, pk), (c1, ..., ct),S(f(m1, ...,mt), pk)),
where ci ←$ HE.Enc(pk,mi).
III. SECURITY GUARANTEES
We consider a general protocol between two parties, referred
here as Client and Server. The Client has input x, while the
Server’s input consists of the ML algorithm f , random coins
r, and the model parameters pre-trained with the training set
y. The protocol, which in general can involve multiple rounds
of interaction but in our case (i.e., CryptoRec) is simply non-
interactive, is denoted by Client(x) ↔ Server(f, y, r). We
chose to give r as an explicit input to the Server as these coins
are used by the ML algorithm f , if probabilistic. Nevertheless,
note that both Client and Server are (possibly) randomized
algorithms as well and might use additional random coins.
The goal is for the Client to learn the prediction f(x, y; r),
so the protocol is complete if the final output of the Client
outClient[Client(x) ↔ Server(f, y, r)] = f(x, y; r). Security
demands that the Client learns nothing on the Server’s input
beyond what can be inferred from the Client’s input x and the
outcome prediction f(x, y; r). It also demands that the Server
learns nothing on the Client’s input x. Formally, we adopt the
real/ideal paradigm:
• Real World. The protocol Client(x) ↔ Server(f, y, r)
is executed and the real-world adversary A can corrupt
either the Client or the Server (but not both at the
same time), meaning A can choose the input of the
corrupted party and observe all communications. We
assume that the adversary is static and semi-honest, i.e.
the adversary chooses which party to corrupt before the
protocol execution starts and the corrupted party follows
the protocol honestly.
• Ideal World. The Client and Server send their input x
and (f, y, r), respectively, to a trusted third party (TTP)
that computes f(x, y; r). The Client gets the output of
the computation f(x, y; r) while Server gets nothing.
Definition 3. For every adversary A, there exist ppt
simulators S1 and S2 such that for all inputs x and (f, y, r):
viewClient[A(x)↔ Server(f, y, r)] c≈ S1(x, f(x, y; r)),
viewServer[Client(x)↔ A(f, y, r)] c≈ S2(|x|, f, y, r).
We derive a simple non-interactive 2PC protocol from HE
and show that it provides the aforementioned security guar-
antees. Let Π be a non-interactive protocol, where the Client
generates its own public key pair (sk, pk) ←$ HE.Setup(1λ),
encrypts its input c ←$ HE.Enc(x, pk) and sends c to the
Server. The Server evaluates c′ ←$ HE.Eval(f(·, y; r), c, pk)
and sends it back to the Client. The Client decrypts c′ and
outputs the prediction p← HE.Dec(c′, sk).
Theorem 1. If HE is IND-CPA-secure and circuit private, then
Π satisfies security definition 3.
Proof. This proof is divided into two parts: We show by means
of a direct reduction to the IND-CPA and circuit privacy
properties of HE that Π is private against the Server and
against the Client.
The client’s view viewClient[Client(x) ↔ Server(f, y, r)]
consists of tuples of the form (sk, pk, x, c, c′). Let S be a
simulator for circuit privacy [Definition 2]. Let S1(sk, pk, x,
f(x, y; r)) be an algorithm that uses S(f(x, y; r), pk)) as a
subroutine to produce c′ and outputs (sk, pk, x,HE.Enc(x, pk),
c′). Suppose that Π is not secure and that there is a suc-
cessful distinguisher D1 that distinguishes viewClient[A(x)↔
Server(f, y, r)] from S1(sk, pk, x, f(x, y; r)) with non-
negligible probability. If D1 exists, then a successful
distinguisher D against simulator S also exists, which
contradicts the circuit privacy property of HE: Distin-
guisher D(sk, pk, c, c′) decrypts x ← HE.Dec(c, sk), runs
D1(sk, pk, x, c, c′) as a subroutine, and outputs whatever D1
outputs, winning whenever D1’s guess is correct.
The server’s view viewServer[Client(x) ↔ Server(f, y, r)]
consists of tuples of the form (pk, c). Let S2(pk, |x|) be
the algorithm that samples x′ ←$ {0, 1}|x|, encrypts c ←$
HE.Enc(x′, pk) and returns (pk, c). Suppose that Π is not
secure and that there is a successful distinguisher D2 that dis-
tinguishes viewServer[Client(x) ↔ A(f, y, r)] from S2(pk, c)
with non-negligible probability. Then, we can construct an
adversary B against the IND-CPA property of HE as follows:
B gets x from Client and samples x′ ←$ {0, 1}|x| as S2. B
then asks to be challenged on the pair (x, x′) and gets the
ciphertext c that encrypts either x or x′. B runs distinguisher
D2(pk, c) as a subroutine and outputs D2’s guess as its own.
B perfectly simulates for D2 either the real-world or the ideal-
world of simulator S2, winning the IND-CPA game whenever
D2’s guess is correct.
Remarks on our security model. First, the security guaran-
tees extend those of 2PC, as circuit privacy allows us to hide
the ML algorithm f from the Client, in addition to protecting
the pre-trained model y and random coins r. Secondly, if
the underlying HE scheme is circuit-private against malicious
adversaries [22] then our protocol automatically satisfies a
definition of similar “flavor” and becomes secure against
malicious adversaries. Note that in our CryptoRec protocol the
Client talks first and viewServer[Client(x)↔ A(f, y, r)] is the
same regardless A is malicious or semi-honest. Therefore, we
only need to consider security against malicious adversaries
for circuit privacy. Third, we cannot guarantee the predictions
that the Server computes are correct (In fact, the Server
has incentives to compute predictions correctly). Security
guarantees that nothing about the Client’s input is revealed
to the Server and nothing about the Server’s prediction model
is revealed to the Client beyond what can be inferred by the
prediction. Lastly, since we rely on a standard definition of
circuit privacy, which pertains to the case of a single use of
each public key, the Client needs to generate a new key-pair
for each query.
IV. CRYPTOREC
In this section, we present CryptoRec, a non-interactive
secure 2PC protocol built on top of a new homomorphic
encryption-friendly recommender system, referred to as Cryp-
toRec’s model. In Section IV-A, we introduce CryptoRec’s
model. In Section IV-B we explain how to train the model
and learn the parameters Θ. Finally, in Section IV-C, we
combine the prediction procedure of our model with ho-
momorphic encryption. This gives rise to our CryptoRec
protocol. We also consider a second variant of the protocol in
which the model parameters Θ are retrained before computing
recommendations. The re-training occurs in encrypted form,
therefore it results in better accuracy without compromising
security. Naturally, the computational cost on the Server side
is considerably heavier.
A. CryptoRec’s Model
Existing collaborative filtering (CF) technologies require
non-linear operations or re-training with the Client’s data [3]–
[6]. Directly applying the existing CFs to encrypted data
leads to severe efficiency problems. To address this issue, we
propose CryptoRec’s model, a new homomorphic encryption
friendly recommender system. It models user-item interaction
behaviors in an item-only latent feature space. This means
that the user features do not exist in the latent feature space,
the model will automatically compute the user features by
aggregating pre-learned item features. This property allows
the Server with a pre-trained model to provide recommen-
dations for the Client without having to re-train the model
with the Client’s data. Algebraic operations in CryptoRec’s
model are constrained to only additions and multiplications,
thus CryptoRec’s model is straightforwardly compatible with
homomorphic encryption schemes.
We exploit the fact that a user profile is essentially identified
by items that the user has rated, to construct personalized user
features in an item-only latent feature space. In particular, we
model the personalized user features pu by aggregating pre-
learned item features Q = {qi}mi=1 as follows,
pu = ruQ (7)
therefore we can approximate an observed rating rui by
rui ≈ rˆui = (ruQ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pu
qTi (8)
Using only a single latent feature space Q to model a large
number of ratings often leads to an information bottleneck. To
address this issue, we relax the item features which were used
to construct user features P, and redefine the Equation (8) as
rui ≈ (ruA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pu
qTi (9)
Note that A ∈ Rm×d is a new item feature space.
We now have the basic form of CryptoRec’s model which
has an item-only latent feature space and relies only on ad-
dition and multiplication operations. However, it is not robust
enough in practice due to the high variance of individual user
or item behaviors, commonly known as biases. For example,
real-world datasets exhibit large systematic tendencies for
some users to give higher ratings than others, and for some
items to receive higher ratings than others [4]. To address
this issue, a common approach is to identify the portion of
these ratings that individual user or item biases can explain,
subjecting only the true interaction portion of the ratings to
latent factor modeling [4]. The user and item biases are often
approximated by
bui = µ+ bu + bi (10)
where µ =
∑
(u,i)∈R rui
N is the global rating average, N is the
number of observed ratings. bu and bi approximate user bias
and item biases, respectively. To obtain bu and bi, we can
either compute bu = r¯u − µ and bi = r¯i − µ [4], or directly
learn their values from a dataset [23]. The former ignores the
global effects upon a single user or item; the latter models both
the individual behaviors and global effects, but sometimes it
leads to an early overfitting. To maintain both reliability and
accuracy, we separately model the individual behaviors and
global effects as follows
bui = µ+ bu + bi + b
∗
u + b
∗
i (11)
where bu and bi are computed as bu = r¯u−µ and bi = r¯i−µ.
b∗u and b
∗
i are the parameters directly learned from the dataset
to capture only the impact of global effects upon a single user
and item, respectively.
We combine the biases approximator (Equation (11)) and
the user-item interaction approximator (Equation (9)) to for-
malize the final CryptoRec’s model as following,
rui ≈ rˆui = µ+ bu + bi + b∗u + b∗i︸ ︷︷ ︸
biases
+ (ruA)qTi︸ ︷︷ ︸
interaction
(12)
As such, the user preference estimation is separated into two
parts: biases approximator and user-item interaction approx-
imator. This allows only the true user-item interaction being
modeled by the factor machine (i.e., Equation (9)). The model
parameters of CryptoRec’s model are Θ = {A,Q,b∗u,b∗i } 1,
where b∗u = {b∗u}nu=1 , b∗i = {b∗i }mi=1.
B. Training
The model parameters Θ = {A,Q,b∗u,b∗i } are learned by
solving the regularized least squares objective function,
L =
n∑
u=1
||(rˆu − ru) · φu||2
+λ · (‖A‖2 + ‖Q‖2 + ‖b∗u‖2 + ‖b∗i ‖2)
(13)
1For the convenience of notation in describing the algorithms later on, we
omit {µ, bu, bi} from the model parameters Θ in favor of a slightly more
succinct notation. Note that {µ, bu, bi} are not learned by training procedure
either.
where rˆui is defined in Equation (12), φu = {φui}mi=1 and
(rˆu − ru) · φu denotes {(rˆui − rui)φui}mi=1. If user u rated
item i, then φui = 1, otherwise, we let φui = 0 and rui =
0. We use φui to remove the (incorrect) gradients computed
on unobserved ratings. The constant λ controls the extent of
regularization. When performing training on plaintext dataset,
the Server can compute φui by itself, avoiding the unnecessary
gradient computations on unobserved ratings.
As shown in Equation (12), CryptoRec’s model is in fact a
two-layer network. The first layer outputs the user feature vec-
tor pu = ruA and the second layer integrates the user features,
item features and biases to estimate the user preferences. Back-
propagation [24] is a standard method used in neural networks
to calculate a gradient that is needed in the calculation of
the values of parameters in the network. Simply put, we first
compute the predictions given the input data (i.e., a forward
pass); and then we calculate the total error according to the
objective function (e.g., Equation (13)). Lastly, we compute
the gradient of each trainable parameter using the error back-
propagated through the network layers (i.e., a backward pass).
Using the back-propagation method, we have the gradient of
each model parameter of CrypotRec’s model as follows,
∆A =
∂L
∂pu
· ∂pu
∂A
= [(eu · φu)Q]~ rTu + λ · A
∆qi =
∂L
∂qi
= φui · (eui · (ruA) + λ · qi)
∆b∗u =
∂L
∂b∗u
= euφu + λ · b∗u
∆b∗i =
∂L
∂b∗i
= eiφi + λ · b∗i
(14)
where eui = rˆui − rui, eu = {eui}mi=1 , ei = {eui}nu=1, and
eu · φu = {eui · φui}mi=1. ~ denotes outer product 2. We ran-
domly divide the dataset into multiple batches. In the training
phase, we compute gradient by batch and update the model
parameters by moving in the opposite direction of the gradient
(i.e., gradient descent optimization algorithm). Algorithm 1
outlines the model training procedure. The learning rate η is
used to control the speed of model updates. Note that the
training procedure only relies on addition and multiplication
operations.
C. Two Secure Protocols
In this section, we introduce two CryptoRec secure proto-
cols. In the first protocol, the Server uses pre-trained model
parameters Θ and directly takes as input the Client’s encrypted
rating vector to compute recommendations. In the second
protocol, the Server re-trains the model parameters Θ before
computing recommendations. For the sake of clarity, we
denote the Client as v in this section.
Secure protocol with a pre-trained model. Figure 2 describes
the security protocol for prediction with pre-trained model
parameters Θ. The Client v sends JrvK and Jr¯vK to the
2Given two vectors x1×m and yn×1, (x ~ y)ij = xiyj
Algorithm 1 CryptoRec’s model training procedure T
Input: Rating R, rating indicator Φ , user mean ratings
r¯u = {r¯u}nu=1, Θ = {A(0),Q(0),b∗(0)u ,b∗(0)i }
Output: Optimized Θ = {A(K),Q(K),b∗(K)u ,b∗(K)i }
1: procedure T ({R,Φ, r¯u},Θ)
2: for k ← {1, 2, · · · ,K} do
3: A(k) ← A(k−1) − η ·∆A(k−1) . η: learning rate
4: Q(k) ← Q(k−1) − η ·∆Q(k−1)
5: b∗(k)u ← b∗(k−1)u − η ·∆b∗(k−1)u
6: b∗(k)i ← b∗(k−1)i − η ·∆b∗(k−1)i
7: return Θ = {A(K),Q(K),b∗(K)u ,b∗(K)i }
Server, which executes the prediction process P (described
in Figure 2) and returns the encrypted results rˆv .
User (Input: rv, r¯v) Server ( Input: Θ)JrvK ←$ HE.Enc(rv, pk)Jr¯vK ←$ HE.Enc(r¯v, pk)JχK← {JrvK, Jr¯vK} JχK−−→ JrˆvK← P(JχK,Θ)JrˆvK←−−
rˆv ← HE.Dec(JrˆvK, sk)
Fig. 2: CryptoRec with pre-trained Θ = {A,Q,b∗u,b∗i }
Algorithm 2 CryptoRec’s model prediction procedure P
Input: Ratings JrvK, Jr¯vK , Θ = {A,Q,b∗u,b∗i , µ,bu,bi}
Output: Recommendations JrˆvK
1: procedure P({JrvK, Jr¯vK},Θ)
2: if b∗v /∈ b∗u then . b∗v ∈ b∗u if re-traininng the Θ
3: b∗v ←
∑n
u=1 b
∗
u
n
4: JpvK← JrvKA . HE dot-product using  and ⊕
5: for i← [1, 2, · · · ,m] do
6: Jx1K← (bi + b∗i + b∗v)⊕ Jr¯vK . bv ← r¯v − µ
7: Jx2K← JpvKqTi
8: JrˆviK← Jx1K⊕ Jx2K
9: JrˆvK[i]← JrˆviK
10: return JrˆvK
We present the prediction process P of CryptoRec’s model
in Algorithm 2. The computation is straightforward since
CryptoRec’s model contains only addition and multiplication
operations, as we can observe in Equation (12). The inputs
of this algorithm are the Client’s encrypted rating vector JrvK,
the average rating Jr¯vK and model parameters Θ. Since the
Client’s b∗v is unknown to the Server, b
∗
v is set to the average
value of b∗u (line 2-3, Algorithm 2).
Secure protocol with re-training. In order to achieve the
most accurate predictions, we introduce a re-training process
to the CryptoRec protocol, shown in Figure 3. Compared to
the secure protocol without a re-training step (using only a
pre-trained model, Figure 2), there are two differences: The
first one is that, besides JrvK and Jr¯vK, the user also sends
the encrypted indication vector JφvK to the Server, which will
be used in the training procedure T . The second one is that,
before computing recommendations using P (Algorithm 2),
the Server re-trains the model parameters Θ with the Client’s
inputs.
User (Input: rv,φv, r¯v) Server ( Input: Θ)JrvK ←$ HE.Enc(rv, pk)JφvK ←$ HE.Enc(φv, pk)Jr¯vK ←$ HE.Enc(r¯v, pk)JχK← {JrvK, JφvK, Jr¯vK} JχK−−→ JΘK← T (JχK,Θ)Jχ1K← {JrvK, Jr¯vK}JrˆvK← P(Jχ1K, JΘK)JrˆvK←−−
rˆv ←$ HE.Dec(JrˆvK, sk)
Fig. 3: CryptoRec with re-training Θ = {A,Q,b∗u,b∗i }
The training procedure T is described in Algorithm 1,
takes advantage of homomophic properties of the encryption
scheme. It is worth stressing that in the re-training protocol,
we re-train the model parameters Θ with only the Client’s
data, not the Server’s dataset. For efficiency reasons, the Server
should pre-train the model parameters Θ on its dataset. Note
that after the re-training process, the model parameters Θ are
encrypted. So the related algebraic operations in the prediction
process P should be also updated to their corresponding
homomorphic operations.
It’s important to notice that both protocols presented here
are instances of the general non-interactive 2PC protocol of
Section III, in which the Client’s input x is set as (rv,φv, r¯v),
and the Server’s inputs y and r are set as (R,Φ, r¯v) and as
the random coins of the training procedure T . The function f
that is homomorphically evaluated is set as a composition of
the training procedure T and the prediction procedure P , i.e.
in the first CryptoRec protocol, without any re-training step,
f(x, y; r) := P(x, T (y; r)) and in second CryptoRec protocol
f(x, y; (r1, r2)) := P(x, T (x, T (y; r1); r2)). Therefore, by
Theorem 1, the security guarantees of the generic 2PC protocol
of Section III are preserved in our protocols.
V. EXPERIMENT SETUP
We evaluate the accuracy and efficiency performances of
CryptoRec on the rating prediction task and compare Cryp-
toRec with several state-of-the-art collaborative filtering al-
gorithms, including item-based NBM (I-NBM) [16], biased
matrix factorization (BiasedMF) [4], user-based AutoRec (U-
AutoRec) [17] and item-based AutoRec (I-AutoRec) [17]. We
test these models on three datasets which are widely used for
recommender systems performance evaluation, as shown in
Table II. The dataset ml1m [11] contains 1 million ratings;
yahoo [13] contains 0.21 million ratings; For netflix [12]
dataset, we select 11, 000 users who have given 1.2 million
ratings to 4,768 items, where each user has at least 30 ratings.
The testbed is a single PC with 8 Intel (R) Xeon(R) CPUs
running at 3.5 GHz, with 32 GB of RAM, running the Ubuntu
16.04 operating system. All the 8 CPUs are used in the
experiments.
user # item # density scale
netflix 11,000 4,768 2.17% [1,5]
ml1m 6,040 3,952 4.2% [1,5]
yahoo 7,637 3,791 0.72% [1,5]
TABLE II: Datasets used for benchmarking
A. Dataset Splitting
For each dataset, we randomly split all the users into
a training set (80%) and a validation set (20%), and then
we randomly divide each user data vector of the validation
set into a feeding set (90%) and a testing set (10%). The
training set simulates the Server’s dataset, the feeding set
simulates the rating data of the Client, and the testing set is
used for accuracy evaluation. In the experiments, the Server
trains recommendation models with its dataset. The Client
sends its rating data vector to the Server, as a query, to get
recommendations. For the models which have to be trained
with the Client’s data (the feeding set), we directly append the
feeding set to the training set. These models, which require
training from scratch with the Client’s input, are identified
in Section V-B. For all the models, we repeat the accuracy
evaluation experiments five times on each dataset. The root
mean square error (RMSE) is adopted as the accuracy metric,
RMSE =
√∑
(u,i)∈D(rˆui − rui)2
|D|
where D is the testing set, |D| is the number of ratings in the
testing set. The lower the RMSE value, the higher the accuracy
performance is.
B. Remarks on Model Training
By investigating recommender systems which aim to pro-
vide accurate rating predictions, we informally classify these
models into two categories as shown in Table III. the cate-
gory “w/o Client” contains the models which allow offering
recommendations with a pre-trained model while the Client’s
private data is not in the training set; the category “w/ Client”
includes the models which have to be trained or re-trained
with the Client’s data. We refer interested readers to the two
comprehensive reviews [3], [15] for more details.
The models which fall into “w/ Client” category often have
one or both of the two following characteristics,
• User and item features are jointly learned in the training
phase, such as MF and its variants [4], [5], [23].
• The input is an item rating vector (ri), such as U-
NBM [16] and I-AutoRec [17].
The models in the category of “w/o Client” often take as
input a user preference vector (e.g., ru). The personalized user
features are automatically captured in the prediction phase,
such as I-NBM [16], U-AutoRec [17], and our proposed
CryptoRec’s model.
We select I-NBM, BiasedMF (the representatives of tra-
ditional recommender systems), and U-AutoRec, I-AutoRec
(the representatives of neural network based recommender
systems) as the comparison baselines.
C. Accuracy Benchmark
Without considering privacy, the model I-AutoRec achieves
state-of-the-art accuracy (RMSE) performance [17]. As such,
we adopt I-AutoRec as the accuracy benchmark model and
train it from scratch in a standard machine learning setting.
Table V presents the accuracy performance of I-AutoRec on
the selected datasets.
D. Hyper-parameter Setting
To train the CryptoRec’s model, we perform a grid search
for each hyper-parameter. In particular, for the learning rate η
we search in {0.0001, 0.0002, 0.0004}; for the regular parame-
ter λ we search in {0.00001, 0.00002, 0.00004}; for the dimen-
sion of the features {A,Q}, we search in {300, 400, 500, 600}.
As a result, we choose η = 0.0002, λ = 0.00002 and the
dimension d = 500. To train the baseline models, we also
perform a grid search around the suggested settings given in
their original papers, as the dataset splitting is not the same.
By doing so, we have a fair comparison.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first evaluate and compare the accuracy
and efficiency performance of using only a pre-trained model
(Subsection VI-A). Then we investigate the accuracy and effi-
ciency performance of a re-training process (Subsection VI-B).
A. Comparison with Pre-trained Models
As described in Section V-B, CryptoRec’s model, I-NBM,
and BiasedMF allow computing recommendation with a pre-
trained model, and the Client’s private data is not in their
training set. In this section, we first verify and compare the
accuracy performance by directly using the pre-trained models
(without re-training the models with the Client’s data). Then
we analyze and compare the computational complexity of
responding one prediction query in a private manner. Com-
pared to the complexity of homomorphic operations, algebraic
operations in the plaintext space are trivial. As such, for
the computational complexity analysis, we only count in the
operations over encrypted data, i.e., operations between two
ciphertexts (i.e., ⊕,⊗) and multiplicative operations between
a plaintext and a ciphertext (i.e., ).
NBM MF Neural Network Based
w/o Client I-NBM [16] ∅ U-AutoRec [17], [25]–[27]
w/ Client U-NBM [16] BiasedMF [4], [5], [23] I-AutoRec [17], [6], [28]–[30]
TABLE III: Remarks on model training
netflix ml1m yahoo
RMSE loss % RMSE loss % RMSE loss %
I-NBM 0.9115±0.007 9.4 0.8872±0.012 6.0 0.9899±0.017 0.2
U-AutoRec 0.9762±0.012 17.1 0.9526±0.007 13.9 1.0621±0.014 7.5
CryptoRec 0.8586±0.005 3.0 0.8781±0.007 4.9 0.9888±0.011 0.1
I-AutoRec 0.8334±0.006 0 0.8367±0.004 0 0.9880±0.015 0
TABLE IV: Accuracy comparison with pre-trained models. I-AutoRec is the accuracy benchmark.
netflix ml1m yahoo
I-AutoRec 0.8334±0.006 0.8367±0.004 0.9880±0.015
TABLE V: Accuracy benchmark (RMSE) on plaintext
1) Accuracy Comparison: Table IV presents the accuracy
performance of each model. Compared to the benchmark
(Table V), the accuracy of the three models is compromised
to some extent (column loss% ), and CryptoRec has the least
loss. Specifically, CryptoRec loses 3.0% accuracy on netflix,
4.9 % on ml1m, and 0.1% on yahoo. Clearly, CryptoRec is
able to provide a promising accuracy guarantee to the Client
by using only a pre-trained model.
⊕  Sigmoid
I-NBM O(m2) O(m2) ∅
U-AutoRec O(md) O(md) O(md)
CryptoRec O(md) O(md) ∅
TABLE VI: Computational complexity comparison of using
pre-trained models.
2) Computational Complexity Comparison: To respond to
a query from the Client, the Server has to predict the Client’s
preferences on all the items since it gets only an encrypted
rating vector (JruK). We analyze each model’s computational
complexity of answering one query, as shown Table VI.
Among the three models, I-NBM consumes more homo-
morphic additions (⊕) and multiplications (); U-AutoRec
costs a similar number of ⊕ and ⊗ than CryptoRec’s model,
but it introduces O(md) non-linear transformations (i.e.,
Sigmoid). Computing the Sigmoid function often relies on
secure multiparty computation (SMC) schemes or polynomial-
approximation [7], [8]. The former requires the Server and
Client to be online constantly and pay the price of extra
communication overhead [8], [31]; the latter leads to the
use of a (somewhat) fully homomorphic encryption scheme
since it introduces homomorphic multiplications between two
ciphertexts (⊗) [7]. Apparently, CrytoRec yields the best
efficiency performance.
3) Evaluation of CryptoRec: As shown in Table VI, Cryp-
toRec needs only homomorphic additions ⊕, and multipli-
cations between ciphertexts and plaintexts . As such, any
additively homommorphic encryption can be employed to im-
plement CryptoRec. In this paper, we adopt the Paillier cryp-
tosystem [10] implemented in the library python-paillier [32].
In the implementation, we scale-up the parameter values to
integers, the Client can obtain correct recommendations by
simply sorting the prediction results. We let secret key size
l = 2048. In this setting, the message size of one encrypted
rating JruiK is around 512 bytes, or 0.5 KB.
Following the pruning method proposed by [33], we remove
the model parameters of which the values are very close to
zero (i.e., [−5×10−4, 5×10−4]), since these model parameters
don’t contribute to the final predictions. Then we quantify the
values of the left model parameters to be 11 bits (2048 shared
parameter values), of which we can reuse most of the related
computations. It is worth mentioning that this approach does
not compromise the accuracy, sometimes, it even leads to a
slightly better accuracy performance. The same phenomenon
has been also observed by some other works such as [33],
[34].
Fig. 4: CryptoRec’s model trained on dataset ml1m: the
distribution of parameter values after pruning (left panel); the
distribution of the reuse ratio of each row of model parameters
A and QT after the quantification (right panel).
The left panel of Figure 4 intuitively describes the model
parameter values distribution after the pruning, and the right
panel of Figure 4 is the reuse ratio distribution of each row
of model parameters A and QT after the quantification, the
model here is trained on dataset ml1m. Table VII presents
the pruning ratio and overall reuse ratio of the CryptoRec’s
model trained on each dataset, where we define the pruning
ratio as # of pruned parameter# of all the parameter , and compute the reuse ratio
as 1− # of unique parameter# of all parameter .
netflix ml1m yahoo
pruning ratio 7.1% 9.2% 29.4%
reuse ratio 90.7% 90.5% 91.5%
TABLE VII: Parameter pruning ratio and computation reuse
ratio of CryptoRec’s models
According to Table VII, we know that reusing computations
on the shared parameter values is able to significantly reduce
the computational complexity. For example, when computingJruiKAj: = {JruiKAj1, JruiKAj2, · · · , JruiKAjd}, we
only need to compute  operations on each shared parameter
value of Aj: (j-th row of A), and then reuse the results at the
other places of Aj:.
netflix ml1m yahoo
Communication (MB) 4.8 3.86 3.72
Server time cost (s) 14.2 10.9 7.3
Client time cost (s) 7.1 5.8 5.6
TABLE VIII: The communication (MB) and time (s) cost of
CryptoRec with a pre-trained model
We summarize the communication and time cost of the
Client and Server in Table VIII. To elaborate the prediction
process and the costs, we take the experiment on dataset ml1m
as an example (We ignore the time cost of a public key pair
generation, as it is trivial to the overall time cost),
• Client: Encrypting the rating vector Jr1×3952u K takes 4.5
seconds. The message size of Jr1×3952u K is 0.5 × 3952
KB, or 1.93 MB.
• Server: Executing CryptoRec on Jr1×3952u K takes 10.9
seconds. The message size of the output Jrˆ1×3952u K is 1.93
MB.
• Client: Decrypting Jrˆ1×3952u K takes 1.3 seconds.
We also implement the prediction process of I-NBM with
the Paillier cryptosystem, where the item-item similarity ma-
trix is pre-computed. Selecting the most similar N items to a
targeted item from a user’s rating history is a typical approach
used in I-NBM to compute recommendations. However, this
approach introduces a number of extra non-linear operations
(i.e., comparisons) which are not straightforwardly compatible
with homomorphic encryption schemes. To address this issue,
for each entry of the similarity matrix, we remove a certain
number (e.g., 30%) of elements which have the least values.
The predictions computed on the sparsified similarity matrix
are asymptotically close to the true predictions. In fact, using
all the items for the prediction may lead to a significant
accuracy loss. In our implementation, for one query, I-NBM
requires 491 seconds, 335 seconds and 306 seconds on netflix,
ml1m, yahoo datasets, respectively. We noted that Shmueli
at al. [35] used an additional mediator (i.e., a non-colluding
global server) to achieve a more efficient solution. However,
we focus on the 2PC protocol without using any third party,
and in their setting, participants know which item to predict
while in our case the Server doesn’t know it. It is not
necessary to include U-AutoRec in the comparison, because
Sigmoid transformations it contains will result in a much
worse efficiency performance.
CryptoRec’s model allows providing accurate recommen-
dations by a pre-trained model (the Client’s data is not in
the training set). So, the Server can provide recommendation
services with a high throughput. In contrast, for the models
which fall into category “w/ Client”, the time cost of the
training process should be also counted, which leads to a
notorious efficiency problem. For example, privately training
matrix factorization on the dataset ml1m needs around 20
hours per iteration (more details are in Section VI-B4).
B. Comparison with a Re-training Step
In this section, we investigate the accuracy and efficiency
performances of using the Client’s data to re-train a pre-
learned CryptoRec’s model. We first describe the details of
re-training CryptoRec’s model, then introduce a one-iteration
training method for the sake of efficiency.
1) Re-training CryptoRec’s Model: Avoiding Overfitting.
Using a single user’s data to fine-tune a machine learning
model learned from a large dataset may lead to an early over-
fitting. To address this issue, we re-train CryptoRec’s model
using the Client’s data together with τ randomly selected
users’ data, where the τ users serve as a regularization term.
We empirically set τ = 10, and τ  n (n is the number of
users in the Server’s dataset).
Fig. 5: Re-training CryptoRec with different iteration#
Stopping Criterion. Identifying the stopping point of a
training process over encrypted data is not as straightforward
as doing that on clear data. This is because the Server gets only
an encrypted model, that the accuracy performance at each
training iteration cannot be observed. To address this issue,
the early-stopping strategy [36] can be a choice. Fortunately,
we have also observed that, for the re-training process, the
first several training iterations contribute most to the accuracy
increase (RMSE decrease), as shown in Figure 5 and Table
netflix ml1m yahoo
RMSE loss % iteration# RMSE loss % iteration# RMSE loss % iteration#
I-NBM 0.9061±0.005 8.7 1 0.8815±0.007 5.4 1 0.9853±0.014 -0.3 1
U-AutoRec 0.8849±0.007 6.2 35 0.8739±0.009 4.4 30 1.0583±0.016 7.1 26
I-AutoRec 0.8334±0.006 0 140 0.8367±0.004 0 110 0.9880±0.015 0 125
BiasedMF 0.8587±0.007 3.0 85 0.8628±0.009 3.1 80 0.9980±0.022 1.0 72
CryptoRec 0.8391±0.006 0.7 12 0.8543±0.007 2.1 15 0.9821±0.013 -0.6 22
TABLE IX: Accuracy comparsion with a re-training step, I-AutoRec is the accuracy benchmark.
⊕ ⊗  div Sigmoid sqrt
I-NBM O(m) O(m2) O(m) O(m2) ∅ O(m)
U-AutoRec O(K(m+Nτ )d) O(K(m+Nτ )d) O(Kτzd+md) ∅ O(Kmd) ∅
I-AutoRec O(K(mn+N)d) O(K(m+N)d) O(Kmzd) ∅ O(Knd) ∅
BiasedMF O(Kmnd) O(K(m+N)d) O(md) ∅ ∅ ∅
CryptoRec O(K(m+Nτ )d) O(K(m+Nτ )d) O(Kτzd+md) ∅ ∅ ∅
TABLE X: Computational complexity comparison with a re-training step. K is the number of training iterations. N is the
number of all observed ratings in the Server’s dataset. Nτ is the number of observed ratings of the τ randomly selected users.
z is the rating scale (z = 5 in this paper).
w/o retrain
(RMSE)
retrain-full retrain-once
RMSE inc% RMSE inc%
netflix 0.8586 0.8391 2.3 0.8485 1.18
ml1m 0.8781 0.8543 2.7 0.8680 1.15
yahoo 0.9888 0.9821 0.7 0.9874 0.14
TABLE XI: CryptoRec accuracy comparison: without retrain-
ing (w/o retrain) - retrain until convergence (retrain-full) -
retrain only once (retrain-once). “inc%” denotes the percentage
of the accuracy increase.
XI. Specifically, the first training iteration leads to a big
step towards the optimal accuracy performance. With 3 to
5 iterations, the accuracy performance can be asymptotically
close to the best accuracy. Therefore, we can conservatively re-
train CryptoRec’s model (e.g., 4 iterations) while still leading
to a nearly consistent accuracy optimization.
2) Accuracy comparison: We summarize the accuracy per-
formance of each model in Table IX, experiment results show
that the accuracy performance of CryptoRec is competitive
with the benchmark (as described in Table V) and consistently
outperforms the other baseline models. Specifically, compared
to the benchmark, CryptoRec loses 0.7% accuracy on netflix;
loses 2.1% accuracy on ml1m; on yahoo, CryptoRec slightly
outperforms the benchmark. Note that Table IX presents the
optimal accuracy performance of each model. In practice,
the Server may achieve a suboptimal accuracy performance,
due to the stopping point selection strategy or the constraint
of computational resource. Roughly, predictions using only a
pre-trained model reach the lower-bound of accuracy, the re-
training process leads to a better accuracy performance. The
optimal accuracy performance can guide users to perform the
trade-off between efficiency and accuracy.
3) Computational Complexity Comparison: Table X
presents the computational complexity of each model. Among
all the models, only MF and CryptoRec’s model can be
trained without using non-linear operations. However, MF
has to be trained on the whole dataset which results in a
serious efficiency issue. In contrast, re-training CryptoRec
needs only the Client’s data and the data of several randomly
selected users (for regularization). We have noted that some
researchers proposed incremental matrix factorization training
methods such as [37]–[39]. Unfortunately, these incremental
training methods either require the Server to collect partial
data of the Client [37], [39] (we assume that the Server has
no prior knowledge of the Client’ rating data), or introduce
extra non-linear operations [38]. Therefore, we don’t include
these incremental matrix factorization training methods in the
comparison. As presented in Table X, CryptoRec shows a
significant advantage in the efficiency performance.
4) Evaluation of CryptoRec: Re-training CryptoRec’s
model needs a (somewhat) fully homomorphic encryption
scheme (SWHE) since homomorphic addition (⊕) and multi-
plication (⊗) are both required. Some of the more significant
advances in implementation improvements for SWHEs have
come in the context of the ring-learning-with-error (RLWE)
based schemes, such as Fan-Vercauteren scheme [14]. RLWE-
based homomorphic encryption schemes map a plaintext
message from ring Rpt := Zt[x]/(xp + 1) to ring R
p
t :=
Zq[x]/(xp + 1) (ciphertext). The security level depends on
the plaintext modulus t, the coefficient modulus q, the degree
p of the polynomial modulus. In this paper, we adopt the
Fan-Vercauteren scheme, a real-number-supported version of
which is implemented in the SEAL library [40]. We set
the polynomial degree p = 4096, the plaintext modulus
t = 65537, q is automatically selected by the SEAL library
given the degree p. To encode real numbers, we reserve 1024
coefficients of the polynomial for the integral part (low-degree
terms) and expand the fractional part to 16 digits of precision
(high-degree terms). The circuit privacy is guaranteed by using
relinearization operations [40, Section 8]. We refer interested
readers to the paper [40] for more detail of the settings.
Compared to partial homomorphic encryption schemes such
as the Paillier cryptosystem, using an SWHE scheme results
in a much larger ciphertext, which in turn leads to a higher
computational complexity for a homomorphic operation. In
this paper, the polynomial degree p = 4096. Each coefficient
of the polynomial costs 24 bytes (using SEAL) [7]. So the
size of a ciphertext is 4096*24 bytes or 96 KB. Taking the
re-training process on dataset ml1m as an example, the item
features JQ3952×500K need 3952*500*96 KB or 181 GB RAM.
Though it is not infeasible for a commercial server, it is too
expensive to respond to a single query while the accuracy
improvement is limited.
Algorithm 3 Re-train CryptoRec’s model with one iteration
1: procedure RE-TRAIN(JruK, JφuK,A(0),Q(0), λ, η)
2: JyuK← JruKA(0)
3: JeuK← JrˆuK	 JruK = JyuKQ(0) 	 JruK
4: JxuK← (JeuK⊗ JφuK)Q(0)
5: for j ← {1, 2, · · · , d} do
6: J∆A:jK← (JxuK[j]⊗ JrTu K)⊕ λ · A(0):j . gradient
7: JA:jK← A(0):j 	 (η  J∆A:jK) . updates A:j
8: JpuK[j]← JruKJA:jK . computes user features
9: release JA:jK, JxuK[j]
10: release JruK
11: for i← {1, 2, · · · ,m} do
12: J∆qiK← JφuK[i]⊗ ((JeuK[i]⊗ JyuK)⊕ λ · q(0)i )
13: JqiK← q(0)i 	 (η  J∆qiK) . updates qi
14: JrˆuK[i]← JpuKJqiK . computes the prediction rˆui
15: release JqiK, JeuK[i], JφuK[i]
16: return JrˆuK
By exploiting the fact that the first re-training iteration
contributes a big portion to the accuracy increase (Table XI),
we introduce an efficient one-iteration re-training method,
described in Algorithm 33. The gradients of parameters are
presented in Equation (14). The basic idea of this method is
to timely release the model parameters which will not be used
in the future (line 9, 10, 15, Algorithm 3). For example, we
immediately release JA:jK and JxuK[j] after computing JpuK[j]
(line 9), where A:j denotes j-th column of matrix A. Q(0)
and A(0) are pre-trained model parameters. JxK ∗ JyK denotes
{JxiK∗ JyiK}m and x∗ JyK denotes {xi ∗ JyiK}m , where ∗ can
be any operator such as ⊕,⊗. 	 is homomorphic subtraction
which can be implemented by ⊕. With Algorithm 3, we
can complete the one-iteration training process (including
computing the predictions) with less than 2 GB RAM.
netflix ml1m yahoo
Communication (GB) 1.31 1.08 1.04
Server time cost (H) 9.4 7.8 7.5
Client time cost (s) 14.3 11.8 11.4
TABLE XII: The communication and time cost of CryptoRec
with one-iteration re-training process
We summarize the communication and time costs of the
Client and Server in Table XII. We take the experiment on
3For simplicity, we omitted from Algorithm 3 the bias terms and the τ
number of randomly chosen users (Section VI-B1). Note that the gradients
computed from the data of the τ users and the pre-trained model parameters
are plaintext. Therefore, all the operations related to the τ users are in
plaintext, and have a trivial impact on the efficiency performance.
dataset ml1m as an example to introduce the cost on the two
sides, respectively,
• Client: Encrypting the rating vector r1×3952u and indica-
tion vector φ1×3952u takes 9.6 seconds. The message size
of Jr1×3952u K and Jφ1×3952u K is 96× 3952× 2 KB, or 741
MB.
• Server: Executing CryptoRec on Jr1×3952u K takes 7.8
hours. The message size of the output is Jrˆ1×3952u K is
370.5 MB.
• Client: Decrypting Jrˆ1×3952u K takes 2.2 seconds.
In contrast, the models which fall into “w/ Client” category
lead to a much higher time cost. For example, a recent work,
GraphSC [41], shows that a single iteration of training MF (the
dimension of user/item features is 10), on the same dataset
ml1m, took roughly 13 hours to run on 7 machines with 128
processors. In our setting, by making full use of the fact that
the Server knows most of the users data, it still needs around
20 hours for any i-th iteration with 8 processors, where i > 1.
Worse, dozens of iterations are necessary for convergence [4],
[42].
C. Discussion on Privacy and Scalability
In this paper, we assume that the Server and Client should
always agree upon a set of items, as it does not make sense
to buy a service that the other party doesn’t have, and vice
versa. In fact, this assumption leads to a a trade-off between
privacy and scalability. Informally, the more items that the two
sides agreed on, the more privacy can be preserved. An online
service provider (e.g., Youtube) may have millions of products,
it is a notoriously challenging problem to provide recommen-
dations from such a large corpus, even on clear data. A typical
approach is to generate a small set of candidates, then compute
recommendations from the candidates [43]. For our scenario,
context information can be used to guide candidate generation,
but still depending on whether such a context information is
a privacy issue that the Client cares about (different users
may have different concerns about privacy). The Server can
train different recommendation models over datasets generated
by different criteria such as children-friendly, place-of-origin,
time-of-produce and so on. The Client can choose a criterion
which doesn’t violate her privacy concern, or choose multiple
criteria at a time. How to design these criteria requires a further
investigation of user preferences on privacy.
VII. RELATED WORK
Canny et al. [1] introduced a privacy-preserving solution for
training collaborative filtering models (e.g., Singular Value De-
composition) in a peer-to-peer manner without assuming any
trusted server. Nikolaenko et al. [42] proposed a garbled cir-
cuits [9] based secure protocol to allow multiple users jointly
train matrix factorization (MF), in which they assume two
non-colluding servers. Shmueli et al. [35] discussed that multi-
party privately learn a neighborhood-based recommendation
model by assuming a mediator that performs intermediate
computations on encrypted data supplied by each party. Nayak
at al. [41] brought parallelism to the secure implementation
of oblivious version of graph-based algorithms (e.g., MF).
Mohassel et al. [44] further improved the efficiency of a
secure framework with two non-colluding servers. The above
solutions aim to privately train existing machine learning
models. Different from these solutions, we aim to build a
secure two-party computation protocol for Recommendation as
a Service, without involving any third party (e.g., an additional
non-colluding server).
Some recent works, such as [7], [8], [45], focused on neural
network based Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS), the
scenario of which is similar to ours. Their primary contri-
bution is how to efficiently compute non-linear operations
(e.g., comparison or Sigmoid function) on encrypted data.
Gilad-Bachrach et al. [7] substituted state-of-the-art activation
functions such as ReLu (relu(x) = max(0, x)) with a simple
square activation function (f(x) = x2), this avoid the use
of secure multiparty computation schemes. However, this
approach often leads to a significant accuracy loss [8], [45]. To
preserve the accuracy performance, Liu et al. [8] and Rouhani
et al. [45] proposed to evaluate neural networks with resort
to secure multiparty computation schemes. Unfortunately, this
approach requires the Client and Server to be online constantly.
An orthogonal line of work focuses on constructing differ-
entially private machine learning models, e.g., [46]–[48]. In
their security models, a trusted server has full access to all the
user data. It wishes to prevent adversaries from breaching the
user privacy by exploiting the prediction results (i.e., inference
attack). In our security model, the Server learns nothing about
client inputs; at the same time, the Client only learns what
she can learn from the recommendation results. Our work and
differential privacy [49] can be complementary to each other.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed CryptoRec, a new secure two-
party computation protocol for Recommendation as a Service.
CryptoRec encompasses a homomorphic encryption friendly
recommender system. This model uses only addition and
multiplication operations, that it is straightforwardly com-
patible with homomorphic encryption schemes. Moreover, it
can produce recommendations by using a pre-trained model
while the Client’s data is not in the Server’s training set. As
demonstrated in the experiments, CryptoRec is able to provide
recommendation services with a high throughput, while still
standing up to state-of-the-art accuracy performance.
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